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Abstract. This paper considers a fairly large class of noncooperative
games in which strategies are jointly constrained. When what is called the
Ky Fan or Nikaidô-Isoda function is convex-concave, selected Nash equilibria
correspond to diagonal saddle points of that function. This feature is exploited
to design computational algorithms for ﬁnding such equilibria.
To comply with some freedom of individual choice the algorithms devel-
oped here are fairly decentralized. However, since coupling constraints must be
enforced, repeated coordination is needed while underway towards equilibrium.
Particular instances include zero-sum, two-person games - or minimax prob-
lems - that are convex-concave and involve convex coupling constraints.
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1. Introduction
Noncooperative games are most often modeled without coupling constraints between
various parties. Strategic interaction then aﬀects preferences but leaves feasible do-
mains invariant. An important exception came with Debreu’s (1952) paper on exis-
tence of social equilibrium. There, in principle, a player’s strategy may restrict other
agents’ freedom of choice. Later studies of such generalized settings include Rosen
(1965), Bensoussan (1974), Harker (1991), Robinson (1993), Uryasev and Rubinstein
(1994), Haurie and Krawczyk (2002), Pang and Fukushima (2005).
Ours is also a setting of mutually restricted choice. It is construed as a strategic-
form noncooperative game, featuring a ﬁnite set I of players. Individual i ∈ I seeks,
with no collaboration, to minimize his private cost or loss Li(x)=Li(xi,x −i) with
respect to own strategy xi. As customary, x−i := (xj)j∈I\i denotes the strategy proﬁle
taken by player i’s "adversaries."
In general, two types of constraints aﬀect player i. For one, he must choose xi from
a ﬁxed closed subset Xi of a ﬁnite-dimensional Euclidean space Xi. For the other, his
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choice is regulated by a prescribed point-to-set correspondence x−i 7→ Ci(x−i) ⊆ Xi
in that xi ∈ Ci(x−i).T h u s ,a n yp l a y e r ’ se ﬀective strategy set depends on his rivals’
choices.
The problem addressed below is that of computing generalized Nash equilibria.B y
deﬁnition, any such equilibrium x∗ =( x∗
i).must satisfy, for each i ∈ I, the optimality
condition that x∗
i minimizes Li(xi,x ∗
−i) subject to xi ∈ Xi∩Ci(x∗
−i).T oﬁnd strategy
proﬁles i 7→ x∗
i of that sort is generally quite hard. Much simpliﬁcation may obtain
though, when - as assumed here - the product set
X := {x =( xi):xi ∈ Xi ∩ Ci(x−i) for all i} (1)
is convex. This important and frequent situation was ﬁrst studied by Rosen (1965).








be well deﬁned and strictly monotone for some parameters ri > 0,i∈ I. By contrast,





ri [Li(x) − Li(yi,x −i)]
be convex in x =( xi) and concave in y =( yi). That assumption ﬁts the setting of [6],
[20], [21] and [33], but diﬀers in three respects: ﬁrst, data can be nonsmooth; second,
we dispense with strict monotonicity of gradients, but third, we require convexity-
concavity instead of merely weak versions of such curvature. The class at hand is
larger than might ﬁrst be believed.
Section 2 collects preliminaries. Thereafter we proceed to ﬁnd equilibria. Through-
out our enterprise the following disclaimer applies: While customary Nash equilib-
rium is self-enforcing, a generalized version, even when unique, need not share that
desirable feature. Broadly, the reason is that a player may "hijack" the game. For
instance, if some capacity is jointly constrained, a "quick" player could exhaust it by
moving fast. Our concern is however, with computation, not enforcement. Reﬂecting
on this, Section 3 brings out two new algorithms, both using partial regularizations,
relaxed subgradient projections and averages of proposed solutions. These algorithms
are specialized versions of general saddle-point methods developed in [19] and [30].
Section 4 proves convergence, and Section 5 displays example games.
2. Preliminaries
Recent research on generalized Nash equilibrium has studied existence by means of
quasi-variational inequalities [5], [15]. To solve such inequalities is typically hard.
Accordingly, numerical methods are fairly few - and their practicality so far not clear
[23], [24]. It deserves notice though, that exact penalty methods, when applicable,Computing Normalized Equilibria in Convex-Concave Games 3
may have much to oﬀer. For a precise statement denote by dist(xi,C i(x−i)) the dis-
tance from xi to Ci(x−i). Also, write X−i := Πj∈I8iXj.
Proposition 1. (On exact penalty)
• Let Li(xi,x −i) be Lipschitz continuous in xi ∈ Xi with modulus <λ i(x−i). Suppose
Xi∩Ci(x−i) is nonempty closed whenever x−i ∈ X−i. Also suppose there is a penalty
Pi(xi,x −i) that vanishes when xi ∈ Xi ∩ Ci(x−i) and satisﬁes
Pi(xi,x −i) ≥ λi(x−i)dist(xi,C i(x−i)) whenever xi / ∈ Ci(x−i).
Consider the game that has modiﬁed cost functions i 7→ Li(xi,x −i)+Pi(xi,x −i) and
no coupling constraints. Each Nash equilibrium of the latter game solves the original
one.
• In particular, let Xi be compact convex, Li(xi,x −i) jointly continuous - and convex
Lipschitz in xi with modulus smaller than a continuous λi(x−i).I fx−i 7→ C−i(x−i)
is continuous with Xi ∩Ci(x−i) nonempty convex for each x−i ∈ X−i, then the game
with modiﬁed cost functions
i 7→ Li(xi,x −i)+λi(x−i)dist(xi,C i(x−i)) (2)
has a Nash equilibrium that solves the original constrained game.
Proof. Fix any i ∈ I and x−i ∈ X−i. If xi ∈ XiÂCi(x−i), let ¯ xi be any closest
approximation in Xi ∩ Ci(x−i). Then
Li(¯ xi,x −i)+Pi(¯ xi,x −i)=Li(¯ xi,x −i) <L i(xi,x −i)+λi(x−i)k¯ xi − xik
≤ Li(xi,x −i)+Pi(xi,x −i).
Thus, in the modiﬁed game the best response of player i always belongs to Xi∩Ci(x−i).
This takes care of the ﬁrst bullet. For the second, note that Li(xi,x −i), being convex
in xi near Xi, becomes indeed Lipschitz in that variable there. Further, objective (2)
is convex in xi and jointly continuous. Finally, because each Xi is nonempty compact
convex, the assertion in the last bullet follows from standard existence results [22]. ¤
Our chief concern is with computation of equilibria, not their existence. So hence-
forth we take existence for granted. Also, we shall deal with tractable instances that
need neither quasi-variational inequalities nor exact penalty methods. As indicated
above, tractability is had here as follows. While it’s commonplace to demand that all
images Xi ∩Ci(x−i) are convex, we rather require that the product set X, as deﬁned
in (1), is convex. To see the bite of this assumption, suppose, quite generally, that
Xi ∩ Ci(x−i)={xi : ci(xi,x −i) ≤ 0}
for some real-valued function ci. Then it suﬃces for convexity of Xi∩Ci(x−i) to have
ci(xi,x −i) convex (or merely quasi-convex) in xi. By contrast, to ensure convexity of
X one would typically require that each ci(xi,x −i) be jointly convex.Computing Normalized Equilibria in Convex-Concave Games 4
Given the coupling constraint x ∈ X and positive numbers ri,i∈ I, Rosen (1965)






−i) subject to x ∈ X.
Obviously, normalized equilibria are Nash equilibria, but, as illustrated in Example
7 below, the converse is not true in general - unless, of course, Xi always, and for
each i, is contained in Ci(x−i). Normalized equilibria are available under reasonable
conditions. Following verbatim the proof of Theorem 3.1 in Nikaidô-Isoda (1955) we
can strengthen Rosen’s (1965) existence result slightly:
Proposition 2. (Existence of normalized equilibrium) Suppose X as deﬁned in
(1) is nonempty compact convex. If Li(xi,x −i) is convex in xi, continuous in x−i,
and
P
i∈I Li(x) is continuous, then there exists a normalized equilibrium. ¤
Proposition 2 motivates a standing assumption: X is nonempty compact con-
vex, and each Li(xi,x −i) is convex in xi and ﬁnite-valued near X. Equilibrium is
then fully characterized by essential marginal costs, that is, by partial subdiﬀerentials
Mi(x): =∂xiLi(x) and normal cones. To state this, let N(x) denote the normal cone to
X at its member x, P the orthogonal projection onto X,a n dM(r,x): =[ riMi(x)]i∈I
the vector of scaled subdiﬀerentials. Then, standard optimality conditions of convex
programming [27] yield:
Proposition 3. (Equilibria occur where essential marginal costs are zero) The fol-
lowing three statements are necessary and suﬃcient for x∗ ∈ X to be a normalized
equilibrium with strictly positive parameter vector r =( ri):
• ∃g∗ ∈ M(r,x∗) such that hg∗,x− x∗i ≥ 0 for all x∈ X;
• 0 ∈ M(r,x∗)+N(x∗);
• x∗ ∈ P[x∗ − sM(r,x∗)] for all s>0. ¤
These bullets beg use of established computational techniques. In particular, be-
cause the ﬁrst is a variational inequality, a plethora of corresponding algorithms may
come into play [11]. Likewise, the second bullet directs attention to proximal point
procedures [13], [14], [28], and especially, to splitting methods [8]. Finally, the last
bullet indicates that subgradient projections might oﬀer a good avenue [3], [10].
In any event, to make progress along any of these lines, it is desirable that the
scaled marginal cost correspondence x → M(r,x) be monotone - or a fortiori strictly
monotone [29]. However, even then each of the said approaches may meet signiﬁcant
diﬃculties. To wit, proximal point procedures, including those using splitting tech-
niques, although yielding good convergence, are often diﬃcult to implement. They
typically require iterative solutions of similar perturbed games, each being almost as
diﬃcult to handle as the original one. Subgradient projection, with dwindling step-
sizes, has opposite properties: implementation comes rather easily, but the methodComputing Normalized Equilibria in Convex-Concave Games 5
often produces exceedingly slow convergence.
These observations lead us specialize on the data of the game, and to approach
computation along diﬀerent lines. For simpler notations, incorporate the parameter
ri into Li; that is, make the substitution Li ← riLi - or alternatively, if possible, set





[Li(x) − Li(yi,x −i)]. (3)





Now, when solving this inequality system for x∗, it largely helps that L(x,y) be
convex in x. These observations motivate the inquiry below. They make us focus on
games, declared convex-concave, that have Ky Fan function L(x,y) convex-concave
in x. By the standing assumption L(x,y) is already concave in y. It turns out that
convex-concave games admit Nash equilibria that not only are minimax saddle points
of L, but they also lie on the diagonal.
To begin with, we notice that any saddle point (x∗,y∗) of L furnishes a normalized
equilibrium x∗. This feature makes us inquire whether a normalized equilibrium x∗
can be duplicated to constitute a diagonal saddle point (x∗,x ∗).A sb r o u g h to u ti n
the next proposition, the answer is positive. For a main argument there we shall use
the following result of independent interest.
Lemma 1. (Antisymmetry of partial derivatives) Assume L(x,y) is convex-concave
when x,y are near the convex set X.A l s oa s s u m eL(x,x)=0 . Then
∂xL(x,x)=−∂yL(x,x).
Proof. Deﬁne h = x0 − x with x0 in a small neighborhood of x.B yc o n v e x i t yo fL
with respect to x,f o re v e r yα ∈ (0,1),
αL(x + h,x + αh)+( 1− α)L(x,x + αh) ≥ L(x + αh,x + αh)=0 .
Dividing by α and passing to the limit with α ↓ 0 we obtain







1Nikaidô-Isoda (1955) focused on ϕ(x,x0): =−
P
i∈I Li(xi,x 0
−i) and observed that equilibrium






is central in Aubin’s presentation of game theory (1993).Computing Normalized Equilibria in Convex-Concave Games 6









L(x + h,x) ≥ h−g,hi = h−g,hi + L(x,x).
Since a feasible x+h can be arbitrary in a suﬃciently small neighborhood of x (such
that all function values in the analysis above are ﬁnite), −g ∈ ∂xL(x,x). Conse-
quently,
∂xL(x,x) ⊇− ∂yL(x,x).
In a symmetric way we can prove the converse inclusion. ¤
We can now state a ﬁrst main result.
Proposition 4. (On normalized equilibria) If the game is convex-concave, then
the following statements are equivalent:
(a) x∗ is a normalized equilibrium;
(b) supy∈X L(x∗,y)=0 ;
(c) infx∈X L(x,x∗)=0 ;
(d) (x∗,x ∗) is a saddle point of L on X × X.
Proof. (a) ⇔ (b). The equivalence follows directly from the deﬁnition of a nor-
malized equilibrium.
(b) ⇔ (c). From (b) it follows that there is g ∈ ∂yL(x∗,x ∗) such that hg,x−x∗i ≤ 0
for all x ∈ X. By Lemma 1, −g ∈ ∂xL(x∗,x ∗),s o
L(x,x




for every x ∈ X. The converse implication can be proved analogously.
((b)∧(c)) ⇔ (d). The equivalence is obvious, because L(x∗,x ∗)=0 . ¤
Proposition 4 allows us to address a related issue, namely: when is normalized equi-
librium unique?
Proposition 5. (Uniqueness of normalized equilibrium) In a convex-concave game
suppose L(x,y) is strictly convex in x or strictly concave in y. Then normalized equi-
librium is unique.
Proof. Suppose there are diﬀerent normalized equilibria x, ¯ x ∈ X. Then (¯ x,x)
and (x, ¯ x) are both saddle points of L.I f L(·,x) is strictly convex, the inequality
L(1
2x + 1
2¯ x,x) < 1
2L(x,x)+1
2L(¯ x,x)=L(x,x) contradicts the minimality of L(·,x)





2L(x, ¯ x)=L(x,x) contradicts the maximality of L(x,·) at x. ¤Computing Normalized Equilibria in Convex-Concave Games 7
3. Partial Regularization Methods
In ordinary Nash equilibrium every party, quite on his own, perfectly predicts the
rivals’ actions and optimizes his proper response. Here, given coupling constraints,
some coordination is also called for. Reﬂecting on this, our purpose is to ﬁnd Nash
equilibrium using only iterative, single-agent programming albeit subject to necessary
coordination. In this endeavour, while seeking diagonal saddle points of L, we shall
adapt ideas developed for general minimax problems in [30]. Broadly, the procedure
can be advertized as follows.
Besides the individuals i ∈ I,i n t r o d u c eaﬁctitious player concerned only with
coordination. Suppose he recently suggested that the strategy proﬁle x ∈ X be used.
Upon revising his suggestion x this particular agent predicts that individual i ∈ I
will respond with strategy
y
+
i ∈ argminLi(·,x −i),
so as to fetch a reduction Li(x)−Li(y
+
i ,x −i) in own cost. Presumably the coordinating











to be small. So, if possible, he might prudently change x in a "descent" direction
dx ∈− ∂xL(x,y
+).
Similarly, individual i ∈ I, who recently opted for strategy yi, predicts that the











These loose ideas were intended to motivate and advertize the subsequent two algo-
rithms. The broad outline, given above, must however, be reﬁned on four accounts:
First, some stability or inertia is needed in the predictions. For that purpose we shall
introduce regularizing penalties of quadratic nature [30].
Second, the descent directions must be feasible. To that end we shall rely on projec-
tions, designed to enforce global, non-decomposable constraints [12].
Third,w h e nu p d a t i n gx and y along proposed directions, appropriate step sizes are
needed. At this juncture some techniques from subgradient projection methods will
serve us well [25].
Fourth and ﬁnally, equality of the coordinating proﬁl ea n dt h ep a t t e r no fs t r a t e g y
responses is ensured by compromising the proposed updates.Computing Normalized Equilibria in Convex-Concave Games 8
All these matters are accounted for and incorporated in the following two algo-
rithms:
Algorithm 1(Partial regularization in individual strategies)
Initialization: Select an arbitrary starting point x0 ∈ X and set ν := 0.













2 : y ∈ X
)
. (5)
Test for termination: If yν+ = xν, then stop: xν solves the problem.




and kxν+ − xνk ≤ κ for some constant κ.I np a r t i c u l a r ,xν+ = xν is one option.
Find direction of improvement: Select subgradients gν























y denote orthogonal projections onto closed convex cones Tν
x,T ν
y con-
taining the tangent cone T(xν) of X at the current xν.
Calculate the step size: Let
τν =
γν [L(xν,y ν+) − L(xν+,x ν)]
kdνk2 ,
with 0 <γ min ≤ γν ≤ γmax < 2.
Make a step: Update by the rules








where P is the orthogonal projection onto X.










Increase the counter ν by 1 and continue to Predict individual strategies. ¤
The second algorithm is symmetric to the ﬁrst one in reversing the manner of pre-
diction.
Algorithm 2. (Partial regularization in the coordinating variable)T h em e t h o dComputing Normalized Equilibria in Convex-Concave Games 9
proceeds as Algorithm 1, the only diﬀerence being in the prediction steps. Those are
replaced by the following ones.















and kyν+ − xνk ≤ κ for some constant κ. In particular, yν+ = yν is an easy and
acceptable choice.










2 : x ∈ X
o
. ¤ (6)
Some remarks are in order:
• Plainly, the approximating cones - and projections onto these - can be omit-
ted. Indeed, simply take either cone to equal the entire space. If however, X =
{x : ck(x) ≤ 0,k∈ K} for a ﬁnite set of diﬀerentiable convex functions ck,k∈ K, it
is a tractable problem to project onto the cone generated by the gradients ∇ck(x) of
the active constraints; see [29].
• In the absence of coupling constraints, with X =
Q
i∈I Xi, prediction (5) of indi-
vidual strategies decomposes into separate subproblems, one for each player.
• To execute (6) is generally more diﬃcult than (5), given that L(x,y) typically is
less separable in x than in y.
• When compromising updates one need not use the constant, equal weight 1/2.
Stage-varying choices αν
x ≥ 0,α ν
y ≥ 0,α ν
x + αν
y =1are applicable provided the
weight be bounded away from 0 on the variable for which direction-ﬁnding was more
elaborate (with minimization in the prediction step for the other variable)
• Both algorithms lend themselves to asynchronous implementations.
• The proximal parameter ρ>0 may vary, provided it is bounded away from 0 and
∞.
• Instead of quadratic terms in the prediction steps one can use more general map-
pings with similar properties; see [19].
• Procedures (4), (5), (6) invite duality methods. Then, if X equals {x : c(x) ≤ 0}
and is properly qualiﬁed, Lagrange multipliers may guide good design of taxation or
penalty schemes aimed at enforcement of equilibrium play; see [21], [29].
4. Convergence
Our convergence analysis follows the general lines of [19] and [30] with modiﬁcations
that account for the special properties of our problem.
It simpliﬁes the exposition to single out a key observation; namely, that our algo-
rithmic step constitutes a Fejér mapping; see [9] and [25].
Lemma 2. (Fejér property) Assume that the game is convex-concave and has aComputing Normalized Equilibria in Convex-Concave Games 10





where {xν} i st h es e q u e n c eg e n e r a t e db ya n yo ft h et w oa l g o r i t h m sd e ﬁned in the
previous section. Then for all ν












































x being in the negative polar
cone of Tν
x,a n do b s e r v et h a tx∗ − xν ∈ Tν
































































Combining the last three inequalities we have
















Since, by Proposition 4, (x∗,x ∗) is a saddle point of L,i tf o l l o w st h a tL(x∗,y ν+) ≤
L(xν+,x ∗). Therefore












Here apply the stepsize rule to arrive at the required result. ¤
The ﬁrst convergence result can now be stated forthwith.Computing Normalized Equilibria in Convex-Concave Games 11
Theorem 1. (Convergence with regularized individual strategies) Assume that the
game is convex-concave and has a normalized equilibrium x∗. Then the sequence {xν}
generated by Algorithm 1 converges to a normalized equilibrium.
Proof. Since L(xν+,x ν) ≤ L(xν,x ν)=0and L(xν,yν+) ≥ L(xν,x ν)=0 ,f r o m
Lemma 1 we obtain,









Evidently {Wν} is non-increasing, hence bounded. The sequence {dν} is bounded, so





























Let ˆ x be an accumulation point of {xν} and y+ be the associated accumulation point
of {yν+}.T h e ny+ =ˆ x, i.e.,







ky − ˆ xk
2 : y ∈ X
)
.
This is necessary and suﬃcient for ˆ x to be a normalized equilibrium. Substituting it
for x∗ in the deﬁnition of Wν we conclude that the distance to ˆ x is non-increasing.
Consequently, ˆ x is the only accumulation point of the sequence {xν}. ¤
Theorem 2. (Convergence under coordinated regularization) Assume that the game
is convex-concave and has a normalized equilibrium x∗. Then the sequence {xν} gen-
erated by Algorithm 2 is convergent to a normalized equilibrium.







Let ˆ x be an accumulation point of {xν} and x+ be the associated accumulation point
of {xν+}.T h e nx+ =ˆ x, i.e.,





kx − ˆ xk
2 : x ∈ X
o
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By Proposition 4, this is necessary and suﬃcient for ˆ x to be a normalized equilibrium.
Substituting it for x∗ in the deﬁnition of Wν we conclude that ˆ x is the limit of the
sequence {xν}. ¤
5. Examples of convex-concave Games
Convex-concave games may serve as standard models in their own right or as approx-
imations to more complex data. This section concludes by indicating that the class
at hand is more rich than might ﬁrst be imagined. For all instances below the prime
concern is with L(x,y) being convex in x. In most cases the set X is left unspeciﬁed.
Example 1: (Two-person zero-sum games) Any two-person zero-sum game with
convex-concave cost L1(x1,x 2) of player 1, is convex-concave.
Proof. Since L(x,y)=L1(x1,y 2) − L1(y1,x 2), the conclusion is immediate. ¤
Example 2: (Games with aﬃne interaction) Let each Li(xi,x −i) be jointly con-
vex in (xi,x −i) and separately aﬃne in x−i. Then the game is convex-concave. ¤
Example 3: (Games with separable cost) Let each Li(xi,x −i)=Li(xi)+L−i(x−i)
be separable and convex in xi. Then the game is convex-concave. ¤
Example 4: (Games with bilinear interaction) Suppose each cost function Li(x)









for speciﬁed vectors bij ∈ Xj and matrices Cij of appropriate dimension. If the cor-
responding I ×I block matrix - featuring block Cij in oﬀ-diagonal entry ij and 2Cii
on diagonal entry ii - is positive semideﬁnite, then the game is convex-concave.
Proof.S i n c e Li(xi,x −i) is aﬃne in x−i, it suﬃces to show that
P
i∈I Li(x) is




i Cijxj is convex. The Hessian of this double sum equals the described
block matrix, and the conclusion follows. ¤
Example 5: (Multi-person, ﬁnite-strategy matrix games) Suppose each player i ∈ I
has a ﬁnite set Si of pure strategies. If he plays si ∈ Si against each rival j 6= i,t h e





Here Cij(si,s j) denotes the (si,s j) entry of a prescribed Si×Sj cost matrix Cij.P a s s
now to mixed strategies xi ∈ Xi := the probability simplex over Si.T h e n f o r m a tComputing Normalized Equilibria in Convex-Concave Games 13




i Cijxj =0 , and evidently such games are convex. ¤
Example 6: (Cournot oligopoly) A classical noncooperative game is the Cournot
(1838) oligopoly model, still a workhorse in modern theories of industrial organiza-
tion [32]. Generalizing it to comprise a ﬁnite set G of diﬀerent goods, the model goes
as follows: Firm i ∈ I produces the commodity bundle xi ∈ RG, thus incurring convex
production cost ci(xi) and gaining market revenues p(
P
j∈I xj) · xi.H e r ep(
P
j∈I xj)
is the price vector at which total demand equals the aggregate supply
P
j∈I xj. Sup-
pose this inverse demand curve is aﬃne and "slopes downwards" in the sense that
p(Q)=a − CQ where a ∈ RG and C is a G × G positive semideﬁnite matrix. Then




and the resulting Cournot oligopoly is convex-concave. A structurally similar model
of river pollution has been studied, subject to linear coupling constraints, in [17], [21].
See also [31]. ¤
Example 7: (A game of location [3]) Player i =1 ,2 lives in the Euclidean plane at
the address e1 =( 1 ,0),e 2 =( 0 ,1), respectively. While controlling xi ∈ Xi := (−∞,0]
h ew a n t st om i n i m i z et h es q u a r e dd i s t a n c eb e t w e e nh i sa d d r e s sa n d
X =
©
(x1,x 2) ∈ R
2
− : x1 + x2 ≤− 1
ª
.
E a c hp o i n to nt h el i n es e g m e n t[−e1,−e2]=[ ( −1,0),(0,−1)] is a Nash equilibrium.
However, only the midpoint (−1
2,−1
2) is normalized. ¤
Acknowledgement: The paper greatly beneﬁtted from comments given by two ref-
erees.
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